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Property-rights activists have backed two basic sorts of
legislation to protect landowners from regulatory burdens. By
the end of 1995, fourteen States had adopted the first type-a
"takings assessment statute."' An assessment statute requires a
regulatory agency considering an action to prepare a written
evaluation both of the action's takings implications, and also of
alternative actions that would mitigate takings problems. The
second type-a "compensation statute"-articulates a test for
identifying a regulatory taking, sets levels of compensation, and
provides procedures for the settlement of claims. In 1995,
Florida and Texas, two of the nation's four most populous
States, joined the short list of jurisdictions with compensation
2
statutes. The federal government also has been stirring. A 1988
Reagan Administration executive order requires federal
agencies to conduct takings assessments.3 In addition, the House
passed a narrow compensation statute in March 1995, and the
Senate Judiciary Committee approved more far-reaching takings
legislation in December 1995. The regulatory-takings issue has
never been more legislatively salient.
In this Comment, I evaluate core features of the various
takings acts. To provide focus, most of my examples involve the
effects of endangered-species laws. I criticize some statutory
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1. John Tibbits, Takings LawsJust Won't Die, PLANNING, Feb. 1996, at 16. For fuller
discussion, see Hertha L. Lund, The Property Rights Movement and State Legislation, in
LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990S' PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION 199 (Bruce Yandle ed.,
1995).
2. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001 (West 1996); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 2007.001
to .026 (West 1996). Compensation statutes are analyzed in Recent Legislation: Land-Use
Regulation, 109 HARV. L. REv. 542 (1995).
3. Exec. Order 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988).
4. Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995);
S. 605,104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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approaches and endorse others. My remarks build on William
Fischel's characteristically thoughtful Article,5 which, while
nominally focused on the political economy of the military
draft, provides many insights into the issue of the taking of
inanimate property.
I. THE INEXACT ANALOGY BETWEEN HIRING SOLDIERS AND
COMPENSATING LANDOWNERS
Fischel chronicles the Pentagon's shift from draftees to
volunteers. Although much of the military brass had opposed
this reform, Fischel reports that they found that the shift
dissipated anti-military sentiment and otherwise helped their
cause. There is a lesson here for the environmentalists who so
fervently oppose compensation bills. Enactment of compen-
satory legislation might instantly defang the property rights
movement. Environmentalists could then redeploy their
lobbying resources toward raising appropriations for
compensatory payments, an outcome that would enable their
favored agencies to accomplish more.
Fischel nicely mines the analogy between the voluntary army
and compensation for regulatory takings. As he well knows,
however, the remedies involved in these two cases are not
identical. The familiar Calabresi-Melamed framework exposes
6the differences. Although draftees did receive some pay, the
military draft basically protected the state with what Calabresi-
Melamed call a "property rule. 7 The creation of a volunteer
army reversed this legal allocation and protected the citizen with
a property rule. Today, anyone who regards military pay as too
skimpy can simply refuse to enlist. The compensation bills that
are now before Congress provide a different sort of remedy.
They seek to provide a property owner with "liability rule"
protection from a regulatory taking-that is, a right to recover
5. William A. Fischel, The Political Economy ofJust Compensation: Lessons from the Militaiy
Draft for the Takings Issue 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1996). See also GUIDO
CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978) (recurrently discussing
dilemmas of military recruitment).
6. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedra 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
7. A property rule requires someone who wishes to remove an entitlement from its
holder to purchase the entitlement in a voluntary transaction. The would-be purchaser
has no legally-enforceable right to the entitlement should the holder refuse to sell. See
id. at 1092.
[Vol. 20
HeinOnline  -- 20 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 76 1996-1997
Takings Legislation
damages, but not a power to stop the taking.8
The Calabresi-Melamed framework reveals two other
important options that would be available if, for example, a
federal agency were to seek to protect endangered species living
on private habitat. First, following the Voluntary Army
approach, Congress could adopt a Voluntary Habitat program.
The agency could acquire habitat only from landowners who
consented to sell their development rights; others who chose
not to sell would be protected by a property rule from any
government seizure. The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS)
employed this approach during the first stage of its endangered
species efforts, which began in 1966.9 Voluntary acquisitions
minimize coercion and litigation. The shortcoming of
protecting landowners with a property rule, however, is that
government may find it impossible to assemble all pieces of a
unique habitat because some owners might strategically hold
out. This is the rationale for governmental exercise of the power
of eminent domain. Whether this rationale justifies coercion in
a specific setting depends on the characteristics of the species
and habitats at issue.
Less obviously, a legislature could empower a landowner to
buy relief from an onerous regulation at a stated price. (This
would be the famous "rule four" of the Calabresi-Melamed
framework.) The FWS has been using a system of this sort in
Travis County, Texas.10 The agency frees homebuilders who
have contributed $1,500 to a conservation fund from habitat
restrictions designed to protect the golden-cheeked warbler. A
kindred approach would entitle a regulatee to free a tract from
a regulation by agreeing to submit to that regulation on
equivalent, unregulated land. While the "rule four" approach
would not entirely placate claimants who feel they have been
abused, it would unequivocally empower them, at a price, to get
government off their backs.
Lobbyists and legislators are likely to continue to focus on
how, if at all, to protect landowners with a liability rule. They
8. A liability rule is also distinguishable from a property rule in that it is the state that
sets the value of the entitlement, without considering the idiosyncratic value that the
entitlement may have to its holder. See id. at 1092.
9. See Lee Ann Welch, Property Rights Conflicts Under the Endangered Species Act, in LAND
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 151,153-58.
10. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings
and Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. (forthcomingApr. 1997).
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should be alert to contexts where one of the alternative
approaches just discussed would be preferable.
II. SOME DOUBTS ABOUT TAKINGS-ASSESSMENT LEGISLATION
I know little about how takings-assessment policies have
worked in practice. Until those who know more persuade me
otherwise, I urge property-lights advocates to drop this
approach and instead concentrate on enacting compensation
statutes. The main precedent for an assessment requirement is
environmental-impact analysis. The history of the environ-
mental-review process is not a promising one.
A. The Wisdom of Private Policing of Assessments
Who is to ensure that an agency conscientiously carries out its
duty to make a takings assessment? This task could be assigned
to another agency, such as the Office of Management and
Budget. Some assessment statutes, however, authorize a private
party to seek judicial enforcement of the assessment process.
The Texas takings statute explicitly authorizes private suits," and
the reported Senate Bill includes language that hints that
Congress intends this result. 2
Lawmakers bent on enacting assessment legislation should
explicitly state that private parties do not have standing to
enforce the process. The experience under the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) illustrates the perils of
allowing citizen suits.' Although property-rights advocates
might imagine that virtually all citizen suits would be brought by
people who sympathize with the property-rights cause, the
history of CEQA suggests otherwise. If private suits are
permitted, numerous self-interested parties can be expected to
invoke the process in order to delay government action
otherwise widely viewed as desirable.
Suppose, for example, that Congress were to enact legislation
that would disband the Commerce Department and require it to
abandon its current headquarters on Constitution Avenue. If
private suits were allowed, defenders of the Commerce
11. SeeTEX. GOV'T CODE § 2007.044 (West 1996).
12. See S. 605, supra note 4, at § 406.
13. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS 313-31
(1981).
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Department might be able to use takings-assessment legislation
to delay the shutdown. The defenders could arrange for a
property owner-for example, Louie, the owner of a
luncheonette that caters to Commerce Department patrons-to
front for them. Louie might articulate the (legally absurd) claim
that the dosing of the building would effect a taking by
reducing the value of his enterprise. If takings-assessment
legislation were in effect, Louie's attorneys would have a
number of arrows in their legal quiver. If the Commerce
Department tried to close the building without preparing a
takings assessment, Louie's lawyers could seek to enjoin the
closure until an assessment had been prepared. Once an
assessment had been prepared, Louie's lawyers could attack the
"adequacy" of both the assessment and its consideration of
alternatives. Even if Louie eventually were to lose all these
claims, the history of CEQA suggests that he nevertheless might
succeed in delaying the closure for many years while courts
deliberated over the adequacy of the report.
Many other disquieting scenarios leap to mind, because all
important governmental decisions inflict losses on someone.
The holder of a television license might use assessment
litigation to delay federal auctions of other portions of the
electromagnetic spectrum. If the Environmental Protection
Agency were to authorize the trading of emission permits, losers
from that policy change might waylay it with an assessment
lawsuit. Poverty lawyers could invoke the assessment process to
delay the ending of the federal entitlement to welfare.
Those who draft an assessment statute can anticipate some of
these abuses and include language designed to thwart them.
Because there seems to be no sound way to structure citizen
suits, however, an assessment statue should go further and flatly
deny private litigants standing to enforce.
B. The Shortcomings of Information-Forcing
Moreover, I question the wisdom of agency-enforced takings-
assessment policies. President Reagan's Executive Order
attempts to make administrators sensitive to takings concerns by
14
ensuring that takings information is available to them. This is
an extremely indirect, and I suspect ineffective, way to control a
14. SeeExec. Order 12,630, supra note 3.
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bureaucracy. Why should a line agency make use of information
that it thinks is irrelevant? Takings law is a muddle, and the costs
and benefits involved in environmental protection actions are
extremely difficult to quantify. For these and other reasons,
takings-assessment reports are apt to make dreary reading. It is
hardly surprising that Barton Thompson reports that they have
degenerated into "cookie-cutter documents."" An executive's
straightforward method of controlling a bureaucracy is not to
force information on unsound managers, but to appoint line
executives dedicated to following appropriate policies.
I join the property-rights advocates in being generally
skeptical of the relative institutional competence of government.
But for some functions, such as the provision of public goods,
government nonetheless may be the best institution at hand.
Enough of the nation's scarce brain-power has already been
wasted on environmental-impact assessments and the like. If
takings assessments have little or no effect on agency actions,
then requiring them just makes government bigger and slower.
The Republican Congress should be reducing red tape, not
adding to it.
III. Two CHEERS FOR TARGETED COMPENSATION
LEGISLATION
A well-designed compensation act docks an agency's budget
to defray the costs of takings the agency inflicts. Unlike a
boilerplate report, this threat is likely to make an agency snap to
attention. Frank Michelman once urged legislatures to become
more involved in the shaping of takings doctrine. Legislatures
generally are better able than courts to deal with issues
comprehensively, to impose numerical rules (something courts
seem to regard as presumptively unjudicial), and to create new
procedures for the processing of claims. However, the
compensation bills pending in Congress contain a number of
suspect provisions.
A. Attorneys'Fees
The Florida and Texas compensation statutes include even-
15. Thompson, supra note 10.
16. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation Law, "80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1167, 1245-57 (1967).
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handed loser-pays rules for attorneys' fees. 17 The bills pending
in Congress, by contrast, would make government liable for
attorneys' fees when it loses a takings suit but unable to collect
attorneys' fees when it prevails.' 8 This asymmetric approach fails
to recognize that government is not the sole source of evil;
overzealous and meritless plaintiffs can also be pests. The
Republican Congress is already addressing the problem of
nuisance claims in the fields of shareholder derivative litigation,
products liability law, and elsewhere. These claims could be
deterred in the takings arena by a federal compensation statute
that applied the loser-pays principle to all outcomes, no matter
the identity of the winner.
B. Problems with Using Percentage Diminution in Value as a Takings
Threshold
Most compensation legislation provides that a taking occurs
when a regulation or other agency action reduces the market
value of any portion of the claimant's property by more than a
specified percentage, such as thirty-three percent.'9 (The
statutes typically also state that any reduction resulting from
nuisance-preventing regulation is to be ignored.) One can
sympathize with legislators who have sought to create a bright-
line rule in this traditionally muddy legal context. Nonetheless, I
offer two criticisms of the percentage-reduction approach and
briefly sketch an alternative.
In practice, the percentage-reduction approach is unlikely to
create as much predictability as its proponents have hoped.
Appraisers who serve as expert witnesses in compensation cases
commonly disagree because the market value of a particular
piece of land depends on many variables. In addition, the
compensation statutes themselves introduce new uncertainties.
First, disputes will arise over the identity of the agency action at
issue. For example, can a claimant accumulate the effects of a
variety of government regulations in order to exceed the
threshold? Second, in many contexts there will be battles over
17. Seestatutes cited supra note 2.
18. Seebills cited supra note 4.
19. The Florida compensation statute is a notable exception. It defines a taking as an
"inordinate burden" and attempts to flesh out the meaning of that phrase. See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 70.001(3) (e) (West 1996).
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what constitutes a "portion" of the claimant's property. When
building-code officials require a museum to install an elevator
for wheel-chair visitors, is the affected portion of the museum
just the elevator shaft? Is time a dimension in which property
interests can be sliced? If so, a one-month regulatory delay
commonly would represent the 100% destruction of a one-
month interest.
More fundamentally, a percentage threshold poorly reflects
the fairness concerns that underlie takings law. Takings clauses
largely aim to prevent horizontal inequity stemming from a gov-
ernment's decision to impose a heavy burden on a few citizens
instead of spreading that burden through the tax system. The
percentage-reduction approach poorly captures this concern.
What would be better? First, takings litigation should be
structured into a prima facie case, to be pleaded and proved by
a claimant, and a set of defenses, to be pleaded and proved by
government. This is the structure used in mature doctrinal areas
such as tort law and criminal law.
Any land use activity can be appraised in terms of its relative
desirability to neighbors. The prima facie case for a taking
should be that a landowner has suffered loss by being barred
from undertaking land uses whose externalities persons in the
region consider to be no worse than normal. Landowners have a
particularly poignant "why me?" complaint when they are
prohibited from doing what many of their neighbors are
permitted to do. Compensation should be measured only by the
diminution in land value that stems from the prohibition of
normal (or better) activities, and no compensation should be
awarded for any diminution of value resulting from the
prohibition of subnormal activities.
Endange:ed species protection can provide a simple
illustration of the suggested approach. Suppose that there are
two wheat farmers, X and Y, in a region where wheat farming is
a normal and neighborly land use. After an endangered gopher
is discovered on the fields of Farmer X, a wildlife agency
prohibits the raising of wheat on that land. Farmer X could
20. Takings scholars refer to this as the "denominator" problem. The issue was nicely
posed in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
21. As Fischel observes, in a prior article I applied this approach to large-lot zoning
requirements. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86YALE LJ. 385,418-24,489-98 (1977).
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handily make out the proposed prima facie case for a taking
and, if ultimately successful, would be entitled to recover any
diminution in market value that the prohibition caused, even if
that drop were to happen to be less than, say, thirty-three
percent.
Farmer Y is in a different situation. An unmined deposit of
coal is located near the surface of Farmer Ys land. This coal can
be economically extracted only by means of strip-mining. While
strip-mining would not constitute a nuisance in the region in
question, the activity would be unusual and area residents would
regard it as relatively unneighborly because of its undesirable
spillover effects. When another species of endangered gopher is
discovered on Fanner Ys land, the wildlife agency forbids future
strip-mining on Ys land, but does not interfere with ordinary
wheat farming. The regulatory intervention reduces the value of
the Ys land by sixty percent because the coal deposit is valuable.
Although Ys percentage loss may be greater than Xs, Y has a
far weaker horizontal equity argument because the regulation
has not denied him a right to raise wheat, the normal activity for
the region.
Finally, once a claimant has made out a prima facie case for a
taking, the government should be entitled to attempt to prove
as a defense that, in the long run, a practice of compensating in
instances of this sort would not be in the interest of claimants in
general. In the case of Farmer X this defense should fail. It
might succeed, however, in an instance where the regulation in
question was unquestionably socially desirable and the
transaction costs of rendering payment would be grotesque. The
defense should be honored, for example, if a state were to enact
a statewide ban on wheat farming for one year to allow nature to
remedy the effects of the previous year's dust bowl.
C. The Case for Targeted Compensation Legislation
Compensation legislation may be written to apply globally to
all agencies, or selectively to a few. The Florida and Texas
statutes,22 which cover most state and local actions, are global, asis Title II of the Senate Bill,23 which would govern actions of
22. Seestatutes cited supra note 2.
23. See S. 605, supra note 4.
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most federal agencies. By contrast, the House Bill24 and Title V
of the Senate Bill target only a handful of federal programs,
among them the Endangered Species Act. I recommend the
targeted approach.
There are many uncertainties about how compensation
legislation will work in practice:
1. Agency behavior. Will bureaucrats be oblivious to monetary
penalties, however structured? Conversely, will compensation
requirements make agencies overly cautious? To apply Fischel's
more precise terminology, to what extent will compensation
reduce the substitution and misallocation costs created when an
agency is not liable for the losses it inflicts?2
2. Landowner behavior. How much will a compensation statute
lessen landowners' current propensity to engage in premature
development in order to stay one step ahead of regulators? Con-
versely, because of moral hazard, will a policy of compensation
spur landowners to make additional wasteful improvements?
3. Claimant and trial-lawyer behavior. How many claims will
there be and what administrative burdens will they impose? Can
rules about attorneys' fees, and other such mechanisms, lessen
the risks of frivolous and fraudulent claims?
In sum, I have great sympathy for many of the takings
complaints that federal actions have engendered. Nevertheless,
the uncertainties just listed suggest that Congress would be wise
to proceed selectively, not globally. By targeting reforms at a few
of the most potentially abusive programs, Congress could not
only remedy the worst injustices but also initiate an
experiment. Although the results of social-science experiments
are almost invariably contested, a selective statute would likely
expose the baselessness of certain arguments put forward in the
ongoing debate over property-rights legislation. Perhaps the
experiment would be so plainly successful that Congress could
eventually broaden the scope of the compensation legislation
with little controversy. If so, the takings question, like the draft
before it, would vanish from the national political agenda.
24. See H.R. 925, supra note 4.
25. For an explanation of these costs, see Fischel, supra note 5, at 29-39.
26. Because federal institutions differ in some respects from state and local ones,
experience under state compensation statutes may not necessarily be instructive about
appropriate federal policy.
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